Stop, Look and Listen: Premerger Notification Under Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act by Titus, John Warren
STOP, LOOK AND LISTEN: PREMERGER
NOTIFICATION UNDER THE HART-
SCOTT-RODINO ANTITRUST
IMPROVEMENTS ACT
I. INTRODUCTION
Enforcement of the antitrust laws prohibiting anticompetitive
mergers has, for many years, played a significant role in the govern-
ment's antitrust efforts. Yet, from the beginning, regulation of anti-
competitive mergers has been marred by a critical flaw: the ineffective-
ness of post-acquisition relief. Despite the government's impressive
courtroom victories, the defeated defendant corporation has often man-
aged to retain the fruits of an unlawful merger. Effective antitrust en-
forcement will be possible only when the government is able to obtain
preliminary injunctions prior to the consummation of unlawful merg-
ers. It was in an attempt to provide a mechanism for obtaining prelimi-
nary injunctions that the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements
Act of 19761 was passed.2 Under the Act and its accompanying regula-
THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS NOTE:
SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, THE ANTITRUST IMPROVEMENTS ACT OF 1976 PART 1, S.
REP. No. 803, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT PART I];
SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, THE ANTITRUST IMPROVEMENTS AT OF 1976 PART II,
S. REP. No. 803, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT PART II];
HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, ANTITRUST PREMERGER NOTIFICATION ACT, H.R. REP.
No. 1373, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2637
[hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT];
Merger Oversight and HR 13131, Providing Premerger Notification and Stay Requirements:
Hearings on H.RA 13131 Before the Subcomr. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings];
The Antitrust Improvements Act of 1975 Part P Hearings on S. 1284 Before the Subcomm. onAntitrust and Monopoiy of the Senate Comm on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [herein-
after cited as Senate Hearings Part 1];
The Antitrust ImprovementsAct of 1975 Part IL" Hearings on S. 1284 Before the Subcomm. on
Antitrust and Monopoiy of the Senate Comrm on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [herein-
after cited as Senate Hearings Part I1];
TheAntitrust ImprovementsAct of 1975 Part III- Hearings on S. 1284 Before the Subcomna on
Antitrust and Monopoiy of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) [herein-
after cited as Senate Hearings Part 11].
1. Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1390 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1976)) (the "Act"). The
Act was the result of several years of congressional efforts to deal with premerger notification.
Premerger notification provisions were passed by the House during the 84th Congress and were
approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee of the 84th Congress, the House Judiciary Commit-
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tions (the New Rules),3 advance notice of plans for large mergers must
be given to federal antitrust authorities, and consummation of the
merger must be delayed for a stipulated period of time.
4
This Note examines the most recent premerger notification pro-
gram and compares it with earlier programs administered by the Fed-
eral Trade Commission (FTC). Significant differences are analyzed in
the context of two criteria: first, the benefits in terms of more effective
antitrust enforcement under the new program; and second, the disad-
vantages of the program, especially the burdens imposed on normal
business operations.
Antitrust enforcement should improve under the new program be-
cause agencies are provided with an opportunity to secure preliminary
injunctions against unlawful mergers. This is due largely to the waiting
period that must be observed between the time a proposed transaction
is reported and the consummation of that transaction. At the same
time, the new program creates problems by requiring an unnecessarily
large number of transactions to be reported, threatening procompeti-
tive mergers with deadly delay and raising questions concerning the
confidentiality of reported material. These problems are explored and
solutions are proposed for assuring the antitrust benefits of the new
program while, at the same time, diminishing the hardships created.
II. THE OLD PREMERGER NOTIFICATION PROGRAM
Premerger notification programs were established in response to
congressional recognition of the fact that post-acquisition relief is sel-
dom adequate in an antitrust context. Once an illegal merger is con-
tee of the 85th Congress, and the Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary
Committee on three prior occasions. President Eisenhower urged adoption of premerger notifica-
tion legislation in five successive messages to Congress. Such legislation was also supported by
attorneys general Herbert Brownell and Robert Kennedy. SENATE REPORT-PART I 65 n.28.
2. HousE REPORT 5.
The government will... have a meaningful chance to win a premerger injunction-
which is often the only effective and realistic remedy against large, illegal mergers-
before the assets, technology, and management of the merging firms are hopelessly and
irreversibly scrambled together, and before competition is substantially and perhaps irre-
mediably lessened, in violation of the Clayton Act.
Id See Goolrick, The End of the 'Midnight Merger' An Overview of the New FTC J'remerger
Notice Rules, 34 Bus. LAw. 63, 64 (1978).
3. 43 Fed. Reg. 33,537 (1978) (to be codified in 16 C.F.R §§ 801-803). Later corrections to
the Notification and Report Form are reported at 43 Fed. Reg. 34,443 (1978).
"Companies required to comply with the requirements of the new premerger notification
program, which fail or decline to do so, are not relieved of their obligations to comply with the
requirements of the existing premerger notification program." Id. 28,045, 28,046.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1976); 43 Fed. Reg. 33,537 (1978) (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. §§ 801-
803). See notes 19-27 infra and accompanying text.
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summated, five or six years are often required to obtain a final
divestiture order.' During this time the acquiring company reaps ille-
gal profits; the assets, management and technology of the two merged
companies become commingled; key employees may be lost; and good-
will related to the acquired company may vanish.6 Thus, although the
Justice Department ultimately prevails in approximately ninety percent
of all section 77 non-bank merger cases that go to trial on the merits,"
these victories are often illusory.
Both Congress and the courts have emphasized that section 7 of
the Clayton Act is designed to halt monopolies and restraints of trade
in their incipiency, before they ripen into full-scale Sherman Act viola-
tions.9 Yet, without advance notice of an impending merger and with-
out the acquisition of data relevant to a determination of its legality, it
is extremely difficult for the government to carry the burden of proof
required to obtain a preliminary injunction against an unlawful
merger. It was in an attempt to assist antitrust enforcement officials in
obtaining preliminary injunctions that a merger notification program
(the Old Rules) was initiated by the FTC on May 6, 1969.10 The pro-
gram was expanded by resolutions in 1972, 1973 and 1974. t
In general, the Old Rules required that "companies"' 12 meeting or
exceeding the statutory dollar criteria 13 and planning to merge with or
5. Senate Hearings Part I 148. The statement of Ralph Nader and Mark Green refers to a
study by Professor Kenneth Elzinga, which found that an average of 63.8 months elapsed between
the time of an illegal merger and a final divestiture order.
6. See SENATE REPORT PART 17; Senate Hearings Part 196 (statement of Thomas Kauper);
Senate Hearings Part 11546 (statement of John Flynn); Note, Preliminary Relieffor the Govern-
ment Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 79 HARv. L. REv. 391, 392 (1965). In his testimony
before a House committee, Paul Rand Dixon, acting chairman of the FTC, recalled a challenge to
Procter & Gamble's acquisition of Clorox. Procter & Gamble paid $20 million for the assets of
Clorox. The FTC immediately challenged the merger. Before the challenge was resolved Clorox
had earned $60 million for Procter & Gamble, and the company was subsequently sold for $300 to
$400 million. House Hearings 43 (statement of Paul Rand Dixon).
7. Clayton Act, § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
8. SENATE REPORT PART I 8.
9. S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1950) ("The intent here ... is to cope with
monopolistic tendencies in their incipiency and well before they have attained such effects as
would justify a Sherman Act proceeding"). See general, Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370
U.S. 294 (1962).
10. 34 Fed. Reg. 7,592 (1969). See generali House Hearings 100 (statement of Willard F.
Mueller).
"This program exists in addition to special FTC notification programs applicable to the ce-
ment and food distribution industries, as well as numerous FTC orders requiring advance FTC
approval of acquisitions by particular companies." House Hearings 118 (statement of James M.
Johnstone).
11. See 39 Fed. Reg. 35,717 (1974); 38 Fed. Reg. 5,513 (1973); 37 Fed. Reg. 7,951 (1972).
12. 39 Fed. Reg. 35,717, 35,717 (1974).. See text accompanying note 33 infra.
13. 39 Fed. Reg. 35,717, 35,717 (1974). See text accompanying note 41 infra.
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acquire assets or stock of another corporation notify the FTC of the
proposed transaction prior to consummation and file premerger Special
Report forms. 4 The rules specifically stated that the "procedure
should not be interpreted to mean that companies must request Com-
mission approval prior to the consummation of any transac-
tion . . ."" Failure to file the Special Report at the time designated
by the rules constituted default, subjecting the violator to penalties.' 6
Despite the laudable objectives of the Old Rules, they proved in-
adequate to prevent the consummation of unlawful mergers. The FTC
was still forced to rely on post-acquisition relief,17 and the task of un-
scrambling the merger and restoring the acquired company to its for-
mer status as an independent competitor was difficult at best and
frequently impossible. The primary fault of the Old Rules was the ab-
sence of any express requirement that the merger be held in abeyance
while the FTC reviewed the transaction for potential anticompetitive
effects. An illegal acquisition could proceed once the requisite form
had been filed with the FTC, leaving the government to rely on post-
acquisition remedies. It was in this context that the new premerger no-
tification program emerged.
III. THE NEW PREMERGER NOTIFICATION PROGRAM
The purpose of the new program has been described as twofold:
first, to provide antitrust enforcement agencies with sufficient informa-
tion about proposed acquisitions to enable them to make a preliminary
determination of whether a particular transaction may violate the anti-
trust laws; and, second, to provide the agencies with a reasonable op-
portunity to seek preliminary injunctions against the consummation of
unlawful transactions.' 8
14. 39 Fed. Reg. 35,717, 35,717 (1974). See text accompanying notes 59-60 infra.
15. 39 Fed. Reg. 35,717, 35,718 (1974).
16. 1 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) T 4540, at 6932-41 (Oct. 14, 1974). See text accompanying
notes 64-65 infra.
17. See House Hearings 88 (statement of Eleanor M. Fox); House Hearings 175 (table of
acquisitions challenged by the FTC, 1969-76, comparing date of complaint and date of acquisi-
tion).
18. Pfunder, A Basic Guide to Premerger Not//cation, I ANTITRUST 3 (Summer 1978).
The effective date of the New Rules was September 5, 1978. 43 Fed. Reg. 34,443, 34,443
(1978). The Act provided that it would become effective 150 days after enactment, except for the
rulemaking provisions. Because final rules could not be promulgated prior to the effective date of
the Act (Feb. 27, 1977), the FTC, with the concurrence of the Assistant Attorney General, promul-
gated a Transitional Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 800.1 (1978), which was in effect until September 5, 1978.
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A. Overview.
In general, the new program requires that "persons"' 9 meeting or
exceeding a statutory "size of person" test2" who wish to acquire voting
securities or assets in quantities meeting or exceeding a statutory "size
of transaction" test2' must report their intentions prior to such acquisi-
tions and provide information relevant to the transaction to the Anti-
trust Division of the Justice Department and to the FTC.22
Notification is defined as substantial completion of the Notification and
Report Form promulgated by the FTC.23 After reporting, such "per-
sons" must observe a stipulated waiting period before consummating
the transaction.24 This waiting period may be extended by a request
from either enforcement agency for additional information or docu-
mentary material.25 The Act exempts eleven classes of transactions
from its requirements, 26 and the FTC rules and regulations provide
further exemption guidelines. 27
When either enforcement agency files a motion in United States
district court seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent consumma-
tion of an acquisition, the Act requires that the court hold an expedited
hearing.28 Civil penalties for failure to comply with the Act are also
provided.29 In addition, the New Rules state that any device for avoid-
ing the Act's requirements will be disregarded. 30 A disclosure exemp-
tion protects the information and documents supplied by "persons"
f
19. 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1976). See notes 35-40 infra and accompanying text.
20. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a)(2)(A)-(C) (1976). See text accompanying notes 45-46 infra.
21. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a)(3) (1976). See text accompanying notes 47-49 infra.
22. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(d) (1976).
23. 43 Fed. Reg. 34,443, 34,443-53 (1978) (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. § 803.1).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(b) (1976). See notes 53-55 infra and accompanying text.
25. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(e) (1976). See text accompanying notes 56-57 infra.
26. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(c) (1976). A number of exemptions are related to federal statutes that
provide antitrust protection for certain classes of transactions. There are also exemptions for
goods acquired in the ordinary course of business, acquisitions of non-voting securities, acquisi-
tions by companies already owning at least 50% of the issuer's outstanding voting securities, cer-
tain acquisitions solely for investment purposes, acquisitions that do not increase the acquiring
company's percentage of ownership, and acquisitions by institutional investors that will be held
solely for investment purposes.
27. 43 Fed. Reg. 33,537, 33,544-58 (1978) (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. § 802). Exemptions are
available for transactions that are not likely to involve antitrust law violations, such as stock splits,
pro rata stock dividends, intra-person transactions and acquisitions of convertible voting securi-
ties.
28. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(f) (1976). See text accompanying note 73 infra.
29. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(g) (1976). See text accompanying note 66 infra.
30. 43 Fed. Reg. 33,537, 33,544 (1978) (to be codified in 16 C.F.Rt § 801.90). "Any transac-
tion(s) or other device(s) entered into or employed for the purpose of avoiding the obligation to
comply with the requirements of the act shall be disregarded, and the obligation to comply shall
be determined by applying the act and these rules to the substance of the transaction." Id.
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from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act,3" except when
the information would be relevant to an administrative or judicial pro-
ceeding.32
B. Specific Provisions.
Despite basic similarities, the new program differs significantly
from the Old Rules. Before evaluating the potential benefits and disad-
vantages of the New Rules, it would be beneficial to identify the basic
differences between the two programs.
1. Scope of Coverage. Under the old notification program, re-
sponsibility for filing lay with a "company" that had control over any
party to an acquisition that satisfied the statutory dollar criteria. The
term "company" referred to the pretransaction, ultimate parent com-
pany of the acquiring or the acquired party, together with all wholly or
partially owned subsidiaries of the acquired or acquiring company in
which the parent company had an ownership interest.33 Two alterna-
tive criteria were used to define "ownership interest": "either (1) hold-
ing a majority of the outstanding voting stock, or (2) holding the power
to formulate, determine, or veto basic business decisions through the
use of dominant stockholding rights, proxy voting, contractual voting
arrangements, agents, or other means."34
The new program employs a much more complex test in assigning
responsibility for notifying the FTC and the Antitrust Division. Under
the Act and the New Rules, the identity of the "acquiring person" and
the "acquired person" must be ascertained.35 In order to identify the
"acquiring person," it is first necessary to determine which entity36 will
have beneficial ownership of the assets or voting securities to be ac-
quired. This entity's "ultimate parent entity" is then determined by
applying an objective definition of control:37  "either (1) holding 50
31. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
32. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(h) (1976). See text accompanying notes 71-72 infra.
33. 39 Fed. Reg. 35,717, 35,717 (1974).
34. Id.
35. 43 Fed. Reg. 33,537, 33,539 (1978) (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. § 801.2).
Any person which, as a result of an acquisition, will hold voting securities or assets,
either directly or indirectly, or through fiduciaries, agents, or other entities acting on
behalf of such person, is an acquiring person.
[T * ]he person(s) within which the entity whose assets or voting securities are
being acquired is included, is an acquired person.
Id.
36. See 43 Fed. Reg. 33,537 (1978) (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. § 801.1(a)(2)) for the defini-
tion of an "entity."
37. The original definition proposed by the FTC was a strict subjective test focusing on effec-
360 [Vol. 1979:355
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percent or more of the outstanding voting securities of an issuer; or (2)
having the contractual power presently to designate a majority of the
directors of a corporation, or in the case of unincorporated entities, of
individuals exercising similar functions. ' 38  The "acquiring person"
consists of the ultimate parent entity and all entities under its direct or
indirect control.39 A similar approach is used to identify the "acquired
person," except that here it is necessary to determine which entity had
beneficial ownership of the assets or was the issuer of any voting securi-
ties to be transferred in the relevant transaction.40
One of the more significant changes instituted under the new pro-
gram involves the dollar amount that is necessary to trigger the filing
requirement. Under the Old Rules, notification was required for those
mergers and acquisitions in which a company with total sales or assets
of $10 million or more was acquired by another company and the total
combined sales or assets of the two companies exceeded $250 million.
If a nonmanufacturing company was acquired, only assets were consid-
ered for purposes of applying the dollar criteria.41
On the other hand, the Act sets forth three conditions that must be
met in order to trigger the filing requirement.42 First, the Act requires
that either the acquiring person or the acquired person be "engaged in
commerce or in any activity affecting commerce. 43 The New Rules
have expanded this "commerce test" in accordance with the definitions
of acquiring and acquired persons so that the test is satisfied "if any
entity included within the acquiring person, or an entity included
within the acquired person, is engaged in commerce or in any activity
affecting commerce."'
Second, filing will be required only in those transactions in which
a specified "size of person" test is met.4  This test is satisfied if one of
the companies involved in the transaction has annual net sales or total
assets of $10 million or more and the other company has annual net
tive control. The proposal was made in recognition of the fact that ownership of only a small
percentage of the outstanding stock may be sufficient to control a large corporation. However,
business lobbyists attacked this definition as being open to widely varying interpretations. As a
result, business was able to persuade the FTC to adopt the more objective standard finally in-
cluded in the New Rules. This change has been praised as the "biggest business victory" in the
New Rules. Bus. WEEK, Oct. 17, 1977, at 40.
38. 43 Fed. Reg. 33,537, 33,538 (1978) (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. § 801.1(b)).
39. Id. 33,539 (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. § 801.2(a)).
40. Id. (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. § 801.2(b)).
41. 39 Fed. Reg. 35,717, 35,717 (1974). See Wall St. J., July 31, 1978, at 3, col. 2.
42. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a)(l)-(3) (1976).
43. Id. § 18a(a)(1).
44. 43 Fed. Reg. 33,537, 33,539 (1978) (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. § 801.3).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a)(2)(A)-(C) (1976).
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sales or total assets of at least $100 million. In the case of a person not
engaged in manufacturing, only total assets are considered.46
Finally, even if both the acquiring and acquired persons satisfy the
"size of person" test, filing will not be required unless a statutory "size
of transaction" test is also met.47 This test is satisfied only where the
acquiring person, as a result of the acquisition, will hold fifteen percent
or more of the voting securities or assets of the acquired person, or
more than $15 million of the aggregate total value of voting securities
and assets of the acquired person.48 If the "commerce," "size of per-
son" and "size of transaction" tests are all satisfied, notification will be
required except in those cases where the transaction is specifically ex-
empted by the Act49 or the New Rules.
5 0
2. The Waiting Period. Both the old and the new programs at-
tempt to provide government officials with notification of proposed
mergers prior to their consummation. The major difference is that the
new program mandates a waiting period which must be observed be-
tween the time of notification and consummation of the merger. In the
case of a merger or acquisition of assets, the Old Rules required filing
of notification and the Special Report within ten days after any agree-
ment or understanding in principle had been reached. The same dead-
line was applicable in the case of a stock acquisition that would result
in the acquiring company holding fifty percent or more of the voting
stock of another company.5' The FTC, however, recognizing that it
lacked the authority to enjoin merger agreements, stated that "[i]t was
not the intention of the Commission to impose any waiting period upon
the consummation of a merger or acquisition.
52
46. Id. § 18a(a)(2)(B).
47. Id. § 18a(a)(3).
48. The Act does not define the circumstances under which voting securities or assets will be
deemed to be held "as a result of" the acquisition. However, a definition is provided in section
801.13 of the New Rules. In general, all securities of the acquired person that will be held by the
acquiring person after the transaction will be held "as a result of" the acquisition, including all
such securities that were held by the acquiring person immediately prior to the transaction. With
respect to assets, the general rule is that all assets to be acquired from the acquired person will be
held "as a result of" the acquisition. In addition, for the purpose of determining the dollar value
of the assets (but not the percentage of assets), any assets acquired from the same acquired person
within 180 days prior to the signing of any agreement to acquire additional assets will be regarded
as part of the assets held "as a result of" the acquisition, if such prior assets are held by the
acquiring person immediately following the transaction. 43 Fed. Reg. 33,537, 33,541 (1978) (to be
codified in 16 C.F.R. § 801.13).
49. See note 26 supra.
50. See note 27 supra.
51. 39 Fed. Reg. 35,717, 35,718 (1974).
52. 1 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 4540, at 6941 (Oct. 14, 1974).
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However, a waiting period is included in the new premerger notifi-
cation program. The most important provision of the New Rules states
that no company may consummate a transaction to acquire, either di-
rectly or indirectly,53 any voting securities or assets of another company
unless both companies have filed the requisite notice and the statutory
waiting period has expired. The waiting period begins to run on the
date notification is received by both the FTC and the Antitrust Divi-
sion and ends thirty days later. A partially completed notification will
be sufficient to trigger the waiting period if accompanied by a statement
of valid reasons for noncompliance.54 In certain cases, the Act permits
either enforcement agency to terminate the waiting period prior to its
expiration.
Both the Act and the New Rules vest the FTC and the Antitrust
Division with the power, prior to expiration of the thirty-day waiting
period, to require the submission of additional information by any per-
son required to file notification, or any officer, director, partner, agent
or employee of such a person.5 6 The waiting period continues in effect
during the time such a request remains outstanding. Furthermore, a
request for additional information extends the waiting period for
twenty days beyond the date that the additional information is re-
ceived. Further extensions are available only by court order and only
in situations where the parties have failed substantially to comply with
the requirements of the Act.57
3. The Nottcation Forms. The notification form provided under
the New Rules calls for more detailed information and is "significantly
different" from the old Special Report form.58 Under the Old Rules,
53. Unlike the Old Rules, the New Rules clearly state that secondary acquisitions will be
regarded as independent transactions and the premerger notification and waiting period require-
ments must be satisfied for these secondary acquisitions as well as for the primary acquisitions
with which they are associated.
Whenever as a result of an acquisition (the "primary acquisition") an acquiring
person will obtain control of an issuer which holds voting securities of another issuer
which it does not control, then the acquisition of the other issuer's voting securities is a
secondary acquisition and is separately subject to the act and these rules.
43 Fed. Reg. 33,537, 33,539 (1978) (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. § 801.4(a)).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(b)(1)(A)(ii) (1976). See note 63 infra and accompanying text.
55. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(b)(2) (1976) specifies that notice must be published in the Federal Regis-
ter if neither the FTC nor the Antitrust Division intends to take any action with respect to a
particular acquisition within the statutory waiting period.
56. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(e)(1) (1976); 43 Fed. Reg. 33,537, 33,550-51 (1978) (to be codified in 16
C.F.R. § 803.20).
57. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(e)(2) (1976).
58. The reporting form proposed by the FTC is significantly different from the form
currently used by the FTC in its more limited premerger notification program. In addi-
tion to requesting data about the sales, assets, and product lines of the reporting compa-
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proper notification consisted of letters and Special Reports submitted to
the FTC by all companies participating in the transaction. The letters
identified the company, indicated whether the company was an affiliate
or subsidiary of another company and described the type of proposed
transaction, including such terms as the assets and/or stock to be ac-
quired, the estimated dollar value of the transaction, the date of agree-
ment and the anticipated date of consummation. If the proposed
transaction was not completed, the FTC was to be notified of this de-
velopment.59
The Special Report form required detailed information. Informa-
tion identifying all relevant companies, as well as their affiliates and
subsidiaries, and describing the manner in which the transaction was to
be carried out and all stock or assets to be transferred was to be in-
cluded. In addition, data concerning the types of products manufac-
tured and sold along with the corresponding dollar value, and a
description of any mergers, acquisitions or disposals made by the com-
pany since January 1, 1961, were to be submitted to the FTC. In an
attempt to ensure the accuracy of the information reported, the Old
Rules required that each Special Report form be certified and sworn to
by an official of the reporting company.60
While the old form merely required a description of all stock or
assets to be transferred, notification under the New Rules must include
a description of each class of voting securities outstanding after the ac-
quisition, the identity of each person acquiring any securities of any
class and the total number and percentage of each class of securities
that will be held by the acquiring person upon consummation of the
transaction. Shareholders of the person filing the notification form, as
well as the holdings of the person filing, must be identified. Copies of
certain specified Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings for
the past three years must be submitted, including the most recent proxy
statement and all registration statements.6' In addition, all "studies,
surveys, analyses and reports" prepared by the parties to the transac-
tion for the purpose of evaluating the merger must be furnished if they
relate to "market shares, competition, competitors, markets, potential
for sales growth or expansion into product or geographic markets.
' 62
Much of the required information will be repetitive, such as the
nies, the proposed form requires information which would tend to show anticompetitive
horizontal, vertical and conglomerate relationships among the parties to the transaction.
MERGERS AND AcQuIsrrIONS, Spring 1977, at 46.
59. 39 Fed. Reg. 35,717, 35,717 (1974).
60. 1 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 4540, at 6932-41 (Oct. 14, 1974).
61. 43 Fed. Reg. 34,443, 34,447 (1978) (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. § 803).
62. Id.
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"description of voting securities to be acquired" and the SEC filings,
thereby diminishing the hardship businesses may face in complying
with the statute. Furthermore, a person who is unable to supply a com-
plete response to any item on the form may file a statement of reasons
for noncompliance.63 At any rate, the detailed information required on
the new form does not seem unreasonable. The additional information
will be useful in evaluating the anticompetitive effects of a merger, es-
pecially where there are conglomerate relationships among the parties.
4. Penaltiesfor Noncompliance. One change instituted under the
New Rules that seems likely to produce positive results in terms of
more effective antitrust enforcement is the penalty for noncompliance.
Under the Old Rules, failure to file the Special Report form at the des-
ignated time constituted default.' If the report was not filed within
thirty days after notice of such default, the company would be penal-
ized $100 per day for so long as the default continued.6 5
In contrast, any person failing to comply with the provisions of the
new Act may be subject to a civil penalty of $10,000 for each day the
violation continues.6 6 The significance of this tremendous increase in
potential liability becomes apparent when one realizes that a corpora-
tion may derive as much as $10 million in profits for each year that the
illegally acquired company is retained.67 While a penalty of $10,000
per day may not always deprive the acquiring company of the total
profits of an unlawful acquisition, it should certainly provide a more
effective deterrent than the mere $100 per day penalty for default under
the Old Rules.
Some relief from the harshness of the new penalties may be avail-
able if the courts liberally interpret the term "substantial compliance."
In the absence of substantial compliance with the notification require-
ments of the Act and the New Rules, a United States district court may
order compliance and must extend the waiting period until the parties
are found to be in substantial compliance with the Act.68 The extent to
which "substantial compliance" as opposed to total compliance will be
available to businesses for purposes of avoiding civil liability while, at
the same time, withholding a portion of the notification information
63. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(b)(1)(A)(ii) (1976) requires a statement of reasons for noncompliance.
The guidelines for the contents of such a statement are set forth at 43 Fed. Reg. 33,548 (1978) (to
be codified in 16 C.F.R. § 803.3).
64. 1 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 4540, at 6930 (Dec. 12, 1978).
65. 15 U.S.C. § 50 (1976); see House Hearings 88 (statement of Eleanor M. Fox).
66. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(g)(1) (1976).
67. See text accompanying note 75 infra.
68. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(g)(2) (1976).
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will depend on the interpretation given to the phrase "substantial com-
pliance" by the courts.
A liberal interpretation of "substantial compliance" would afford
the greatest protection to the rights of the government as well as those
of the parties to the proposed merger. All of the equities of the particu-
lar situation should be considered. If information is withheld by the
parties for frivolous or improper reasons, this should not constitute
"substantial compliance." On the other hand, failure to comply with a
government request for additional information of questionable rele-
vance or for information that cannot be compiled by the parties within
a reasonable period of time should not constitute failure to comply sub-
stantially with the requirements of the Act.
5. Disclosure. A significant change under the New Rules in-
volves the confidentiality of the notification of a proposed transaction
and the information submitted on and with the notification form. The
Old Rules stated that the notification was to be made a "part of the
public record."6 9 It would appear, however, that the disclosure provi-
sion was intended to apply only to the notification itself and not to the
Special Report form. In fact, the absence of a similar provision with
respect to Special Reports indicated that the drafters intended to ex-
empt this material from disclosure. The importance of such a limita-
tion becomes apparent when it is recalled that the most important
corporate information was contained in the Special Report, rather than
the notification letter.70
Unlike the Old Rules, the Act provides that any information and
documentary material filed with the FTC and the Antitrust Division
pursuant to the Act will be exempt from disclosure under the Freedom
of Information Act.7" The exemption will not be available, however, in
cases where the material is relevant to an administrative or judicial
proceeding. Furthermore, the right of Congress to obtain access to in-
formation filed under the Act is explicitly reserved.72
6. Preliminary Relief Finally, the Act is novel in its treatment of
preliminary injunction proceedings instituted on the basis of informa-
tion obtained through the notification process. If either the FTC or the
Antitrust Division files a motion seeking a preliminary injunction
against consummation of a proposed acquisitionpendente lite, alleging
69. 39 Fed. Reg. 35,717, 35,717 (1974).
70. See text accompanying note 60 supra.
71. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1976).
72. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(h) (1976).
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that consummation of the proposed acquisition will constitute a viola-
tion of the antitrust laws and certifying to the United States district
court that the public interest requires reliefpendente lite, then a district
judge will immediately be designated to hear the action, and the mo-
tion for preliminary injunction will take precedence over most other
matters.73
IV. IMPACT OF THE NEW RULES
Acclaim for the new premerger notification program has been
widespread. Cases similar to United States v. El Paso Natural Gas
Co. 74 will provide the most striking examples of the benefits to be ex-
pected under the new program. In that case, a divestiture order was
obtained only after seventeen years of litigation and six United States
Supreme Court decisions. El Paso Natural Gas Company derived
profits of approximately $10 million for each year that it retained the
illegally acquired company.75 David K. Watkiss, chief counsel for the
ultimately successful applicant in the El Paso divestiture proceeding,
supported the new premerger notification program, stating: "If a pre-
merger notification requirement like the one proposed had been on the
books 20 years ago, I would probably never have had this interesting
experience, but more importantly, the public and the courts would have
been spared the ordeal of the El Paso case." 76
Despite the apparent need for more effective antitrust enforcement
tools, the new premerger notification program has not gained universal
acceptance.77 The major source of conflict is a series of studies con-
firming a decline in merger activity in recent years.78 Opponents of the
new program cite such studies in support of the argument that new
73. Id. § 18a(f). See Comment, The Goal of the New Premerger Notlcation Requirements:
Preliminary Relief Against Anticompetitive Mergers, 1979 DUKE L.J. 249.
74. 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
75. SENATE REPORT PART I 70.
76. House Hearings 58 (statement of David K. Watkiss).
In United States v. Amax, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 956, 958 (D. Conn. 1975), Amax agreed to
postpone the closing of a proposed merger pending the outcome of an expedited trial. There was a
four-day trial and the case was concluded within two months after the filing of the complaint. The
contrast with ElPaso has been noted: "The AM4Xprecedent is exemplary, and shows how the El
Paso problems can be avoided even under present law." House Hearings 78 (statement of Elea-
nor M. Fox).
77. "It is difficult to understand why the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act
should receive support from any American interested in the future of business and employment in
this country." N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1976, § 3, at 7, col. 6 (letter from Martin B.C. Simpson). See
also House Hearings 185 (letter from United States Chamber of Commerce).
78. SENATE REPORT PART I 214-15. There were approximately 4,500 mergers in 1969 com-
pared with approximately 1,750 in 1974. House Hearings 3 (statement of Thomas Kauper).
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enforcement mechanisms are not needed.79 Others argue that it would
be a gross error to interpret such a decline in merger activity as elimi-
nating the need for a more effective program of notification.s0 Still
others contend that plans for acquisitions are widely publicized,
thereby providing the antitrust enforcement agencies with ample op-
portunity to resist unlawful mergers prior to consummation of the
transactions."' Each of these arguments was advanced during the de-
bates over the new premerger program. However, in the end, the his-
torical futility of post-acquisition remedies served to tip the balance in
favor of the new premerger notification program.
In evaluating the probable consequences of the changes effected
under the New Rules, two factors should be considered: first, the New
Rules should be judged on the basis of their contribution to more effec-
tive antitrust enforcement; and second, the disadvantages, particularly
the burdens imposed on government and business, should be weighed
against any potential benefits.
A. Threshold Levels for Reporting Companies.
Jurisdiction is broader under the new premerger notification pro-
gram and, consequently, encompasses a larger number of transactions.
Under the Old Rules, "companies" were required to report to the
FTC. 2 The Act and the New Rules require that notification be filed by
"persons. 83 Thus, transactions involving natural persons as well as
corporations, partnerships and foreign governments are included. The
more inclusive term, "person," was used to expand the new premerger
notification program to include transactions involving certain non-cor-
porate actors regulated under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act8 4 and to include mergers open to challenge under the Sherman
Act, which contains no restriction based on the legal structure of the
merging parties.85
Expanding the coverage of the Act even further, the FTC has in-
terpreted the Act to encompass large, incorporated joint ventures. 86
Because the legislative history is not clear with respect to whether the
79. The Senate's Anitrust Follies, Wall St. J., June 2, 1976, at 18, col. 1.
80. House Hearings 102 (statement of Willard F. Mueller).
81. Id. 118 (statement of James M. Johnstone).
82. 39 Fed. Reg. 35,717, 35,717 (1974). See text accompanying notes 33-34 supra.
83. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a) (1976). See notes 35-40 supra and accompanying text.
84. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (1976).
85. 122 CONG. REC. H10293 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1976) (remarks of Rep. Rodino).
86. 43 Fed. Reg. 33,537, 33,543 (1978) (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. § 801.40). See MnEERs
AND ACQUISITIONS, Spring 1977, at 46-47.
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notification requirements should apply to joint ventures, the FTC rule
has been a source of controversy.87 The FTC plans to review the rule
after one year to determine whether the advance-notice requirement
should be extended to apply to unincorporated joint ventures as well.88
In addition to expanded jurisdiction, the new program sets a lower
threshold level for reporting. Notification must be filed under the New
Rules if one party to the transaction is valued at $10 million or more
and the other party has a value of at least $100 million,89 in contrast to
the combined asset test of $250 million under the Old Rules.9"
Finally, the Act has been interpreted to require separate advance
notice of secondary acquisitions. 91 This differs from the Old Rules,
which contained no reference to secondary acquisitions and were never
interpreted to apply to such acquisitions. This expanded application of
the New Rules recognizes the fact that an acquisition may violate the
antitrust laws even though it is effected merely as a secondary conse-
quence of the primary transaction.
The potential impact of the more extensive jurisdictional scope of
the new premerger program in terms of the increased workload im-
posed on antitrust enforcement agencies is one of the major questions
arising under the Act and the New Rules. Precise figures as to the
number of additional reports required under the new program are not
available. However, it has been estimated that between 100 and 150
mergers each year will qualify under the "size of person" test of the
Act.92 Thus, between thirty-five and sixty-one additional mergers will
be reported each year under the new program than were reported
under the $250 million criteria of the Old Rules.93 The significance of
the additional reports will depend upon three factors: first, the likeli-
hood that the additional reported mergers will have anticompetitive ef-
fects; second, the burden imposed on the FTC and the Antitrust
Division in evaluating the additional reports within a short period of
time; and finally, the effect of more frequent reporting on the business
community.
87. See Merger Notification Business Can Live With, Bus. WEEK, Oct. 17, 1977, at 40.
88. See MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS, Spring 1978, at 30; Wall St. J., July 31, 1978, at 3, col.
2.
89. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a)(2)(A)-(C) (1976). See text accompanying notes 45-46 supra.
90. 39 Fed. Reg. 35,717, 35,717 (1974). See text accompanying note 41 supra.
91. 43 Fed. Reg. 33,537, 33,539 (1978) (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. § 801.4(a)). See note 53
supra.
92. SENATE REPORT PART I 66; HOUSE REPORT 11; Wall St. J., July 28, 1976, at 4, col. 2.
93. House Hearings 172 (statement of Calvin J. Collier).
In other words, 29% of all FTC complaints would not have been reportable under the "size of
person" test of the New Rules, whereas 62% would fail to meet the dollar criteria of the old
program. Senate Hearings Part 1511 (statement of Joseph F. Brodley).
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The argument that the lower threshold level for reporting under
the new program encompasses too broad a group of transactions is per-
suasive.94 Clearly, the purpose of premerger notification is to provide
more effective enforcement of section 7 of the Clayton Act. However, a
study conducted by the staff of the FTC prior to adoption of the New
Rules revealed that, of mergers consummated between February 1972
and November 1973, a reduction of the dollar criteria from $250 mil-
lion to $150 million would have resulted in notification of only fifteen
additional transactions. Of the fifteen, only three appeared to raise any
significant antitrust questions. "In any event, the three transactions
were examined under established merger screening and evaluation pro-
cedures."9 Moreover, the need for lower threshold size criteria dimin-
ishes as inflationary forces produce higher price tags on corporate
transactions. According to one commentator:
[A] limit of $100 million of assets or sales for notification and report-
ing purposes may be lower.than is necessary to cover most objection-
able and economically significant mergers or acquisitions. Moreover,
inflationary forces in the past few years appear to negate the need for
lowering the $250 million assets or sales size criteria.96
The lower threshold level of the new program is questionable not
only in terms of the lack of significant anticompetitive effects resulting
from the additional reported transactions, but also in view of the bur-
den imposed on enforcement agencies and the business community.
The FTC fears that a full investigation of all mergers satisfying the
"size of person" test will mean that "the fruits of [their] efforts might
94. See Senate Hearings Part III 70 (statement of Eleanor M. Fox); House Hearings 99
(statement of Willard F. Mueller); id. 193 (letter from the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York).
"[T]he extension of the pre-merger notification requirement to include companies with a hun-
dred million dollars in sales or assets would cover literally thousands of transactions which have
no legally significant anticompetitive impact." Senate Hearings Part 11573 (statement of A.G.W.
Biddle).
95. House Hearings 172 (letter from Calvin J. Collier).
96. Id.; Wall St. J., Mar. 10, 1977, at 1, col. 5.
There was some support for a size of transaction test even lower than the one eventually
included in the new premerger program. According to the proponents of the lower threshold
level, if small mergers were known to be beyond the visibility of the federal antitrust enforcement
agencies, they would certainly proliferate. Senate Hearings Part I 139, 143 (statement of Ralph
Nader); Senate Hearings Part 1 513 (statement of Joseph F. Brodley). The difficulty with this
contention is that it is equally applicable to the Old Rule's $250 million criteria. However, the
evidence seems to suggest a contrary trend, with less merger activity rather than a proliferation of
small mergers. Furthermore, small mergers might not serve the same business goals as large
mergers. Finally, a series of small mergers could not be used to escape the new program's $100-
million threshold, since these small mergers would soon expand the total sales or assets of the
acquiring company beyond the threshold level.
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not be worth the cost."'97 The American Bar Association voiced a simi-
lar concern: "Inclusion of all such transactions is likely to deluge the
antitrust authorities with meaningless paper and immerse them in un-
necessary administrative duties."98
These predictions, however, should not be accepted without ques-
tion. Not all transactions satisfying the "size of person" test will have
to be reported under the Act, but only those which also satisfy the
fifteen percent or $15 million "size of transaction" test. Furthermore,
although every transaction that qualifies under the "size of person" and
"size of transaction" .tests is potentially reportable, the New Rules ex-
empt all acquisitions above the fifteen percent or $15 million level ex-
cept those that satisfy certain specified "notification thresholds,"
provided certain timing conditions are fulfilled.99 In any event, the
burden imposed on the antitrust enforcement agencies by the necessity
of processing a maximum of sixty-one additional notifications each
year does not appear substantial.
The expanded jurisdictional coverage of the new premerger notifi-
cation program may also impose burdens on business. Smaller busi-
nesses will now find it necessary to submit advance notice of proposed
acquisitions and, since filing is required for transactions involving
smaller dollar amounts, notification will be required more often.100
However, businesses planning an acquisition or merger that satisfies
the statutory criteria could easily prepare the necessary reports in ad-
vance. Much of the information would appear to be readily available
and would not require lengthy preparation.
A consideration of the advantages and disadvantages of the lower
97. SENATE REPORT PART II 210-1 1, 216; Senate Hearings Part 171-72 (statement of Lewis
A. Engman).
98. Senate Hearings Part III 70 (statement of Eleanor M. Fox); House Hearings 79 (state-
ment of Eleanor M. Fox).
Within four weeks of the September 5, 1978, effective date of the New Rules, more than 100
transactions had been filed with the FTC and the Justice Department. 100 Transactions Filed
Under New Premerger Rules, National LJ., Oct. 2, 1978, at 3, col. 1. In the first six weeks after the
rules took effect, more than 170 proposed transactions were filed. 2 Merger Experts Forecast No
Slackening in Corporate Takeovers Under New Regulations, National L.J., Oct. 30, 1978, at 6, col
2. According to the FTC, many of these filings were the unnecesary result of confusion as to the
requirements of the New Rules. Approximately half of all transactions reported in the first four
weeks required clarifications by the FTC, and a dozen or more were so much in error that refilings
were requested. 100 Transactions, supra. Most of the unnecessary filings were a result of lawyers'
carelessness in reading the rules, rather than of the complexity of the law. Id. These problems
should decrease as the bar becomes more familiar with the new program and the FTC issues
formal interpretations of the confusing rules.
99. 43 Fed. Reg. 33,537, 33,539, 33,545 (1978) (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. §§ 801.1(h), 801.2).
100. See Senate Hearings Part 11573 (statement of A.G.W. Biddle); Senate Hearings Part 11
1033 (letter from Edward I. O'Brien). But see SENATE REPORT PART I 65-66 (the Act will not
hamper business with undue paperwork and delay).
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threshold level for reporting indicates that the New Rules will result in
slight antitrust enforcement benefits and will impose minimal burdens
on the government and business community. The additional mergers
reported under the New Rules will involve small dollar amounts and
carry only a slight chance of significant anticompetitive impact. Reten-
tion of the old $250 million threshold would probably have been suffi-
cient for meaningful enforcement of section 7. On the other hand, the
burdens of added notification are not significant. It is doubtful that the
FTC or the Antitrust Division will encounter any difficulty in review-
ing the small number of additional forms which will be filed each year.
If problems should arise, a simple system of priority review could be
instituted. Under such a scheme, the agency would carefully scrutinize
those notifications involving the greatest probability of antitrust viola-
tions. A cursory inspection might be afforded to predictably less harm-
ful mergers. The agency could select acquisitions requiring prompt
and careful scrutiny on the basis of the dollar value of the transaction
and the industry and product lines affected. 10 At any rate, the lower
reporting threshold need not be abandoned on the basis of the enforce-
ment agencies' inability to handle the additional reports.
Similarly, the burden on business is not significant in a direct
sense. Businesses may fie notification for any legal merger at the earli-
est possible date, and those with nothing to hide may seek FTC and
Antitrust Division slspension of the waiting period. It would seem that
the only potential disadvantage of the lower threshold level would be
the indirect relationship it bears to other problems in the new program.
The increase in the number of transactions reported and in the number
of companies reporting will serve to exacerbate any other business-re-
lated disadvantage of the new premerger notification program.
B. Mandatory Waiting Periods.
The most important innovation under the Act is the mandatory
thirty-day waiting period which must be observed between agency re-
ceipt of the notification forms and consummation of the merger. The
waiting period is designed to enable antitrust enforcement officials to
review the transaction for possible antitrust violations and bring suit
for preliminary relief when appropriate. The waiting period provision
has been praised as the most significant and critical factor in the new
101. As of February 2, 1979, the FTC had not developed a system of priority review. "All
forms [were] reviewed completely before any decision regarding Commission action [was] made."
Letter from Malcolm P. Pfunder, Assistant Director for Evaluation, FTC, to John Titus (February
2, 1979) (on file at Duke Law Journal office).
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program °2 -a salutary aid to antitrust enforcement. 10 3 However, there
may be certain problems associated with the imposition of a waiting
period.
Initially, it should be noted that while the Old Rules did not ex-
plicitly require a delay between filing and consummation, in effect, a
waiting period was included. The old premerger program required
filing of notification and Special Report forms within ten days after any
agreement in principle to merge.'04 In practice, the notification was
almost always filed prior to consummation of the transaction. Thus,
the Old Rules contained a de facto waiting period. "It [was] technically
not advance notice but it virtually always [was] advance notice because
usually 10 days after the agreement in principle [was] substantially
more than 30 days before the consummation."' 105
The de facto waiting period theory assumes that there will always
be a substantial delay between the agreement in principle and the ac-
tual consummation of the transaction, resulting from the numerous or-
ganizational problems involved in completing a large acquisition.
While this may be true in some cases, the Old Rules did not guarantee
that a waiting period would be observed. A business contemplating an
unlawful acquisition could artfully postpone reaching the mythical
"agreement in principle" until it virtually coincided with the closing
date. Thus, any waiting period that did exist was under the complete
control of the reporting firms. Despite the claim that a de facto waiting
period was included in the Old Rules, it was not until the enactment of
the new program that enforcement agencies could be assured of suffi-
cient time to review data and seek preliminary relief against unlawful
transactions prior to their completion.
The mandatory waiting period required under the New Rules rep-
resents the most crucial departure from the old merger notification pro-
gram. However, it is also the most widely criticized. The thirty-day
mandatory delay carries with it the potential for disruptive effects
within the business community. These adverse effects appear even
more likely to occur when one considers that the waiting period may be
extended for an additional twenty days by either the FTC or the Anti-
trust Division if either agency requests additional information or docu-
mentary material. 10 6 "To accomplish this further delay, the
102. Senate Hearings Part 181 (statement of Thomas Kauper).
103. House Hearings 79 (statement of Eleanor M. Fox).
104. 39 Fed. Reg. 35,717, 35,717-18 (1974). See text accompanying note 51 supra.
105. House Hearings 88 (statement of Eleanor M. Fox). See also id. 120 (statement of James
M. Johnstone); Senate Hearings Part 1 462 (statement of Arnold M. Lerman).
106. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(e)(2) (1976); 43 Fed. Reg. 33,537, 33,551 (1978) (to be codified in 16
C.F.R. § 803.20(c)(2)). See text accompanying notes 56-57 supra.
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Government would have to make no showing of diligence, or even of
its need for the additional information."' 7 The availability of such an
extension may induce government officials to request additional infor-
mation for tactical reasons whenever they are unable to analyze all of
the necessary data within the allotted thirty-day period but do not wish
to risk allowing an acquisition to pass unnoticed if it may later be a
subject of litigation. 08
A further danger lies in the fact that additional information can be
requested from numerous parties, some of whom may not be under the
direct control of the parties involved in the acquisition. 0 9 Thus, the
persons involved may be subjected to prejudicial delay through no
fault of their own.110
Criticism of the mandatory waiting period centers on the possibil-
ity that such delay may threaten procompetitive mergers and dry up the
capital flow that is essential to a healthy economy. Not all mergers will
affect the market in which the firms operate, and some merging firms
may be too small significantly to affect competition in the relevant mar-
ket. Furthermore, mergers provide a means by which unprofitable sub-
sidiaries and small, poorly managed corporations may be sold, thus
freeing capital for investment in more efficient concerns. Such mergers
actually promote competition by encouraging entry into and exit from
relevant markets.
Many have criticized the new program, or similar proposals, on
the ground that business realities may require completion of a transac-
tion within a very short period of time, possibly because of the parties'
belief that the merger must be consummated quickly in order to avoid
interference by competitors or other interested parties. According to
one such report: "[T]he Committee does not believe that a refusal by
the government to waive the 30-day waiting period should automati-
107. SENATE REPORT PART II 211. However, one could argue that parties need not comply
with a government request for irrelevant information.
[A] Government request for material of dubious or marginal relevance, or a request for
data that could not be compiled or reduced to writing in a relatively short period of time,
might well be unreasonable. In these cases, a failure to comply with such unreasonable
portions of a request would not constitute a failure to "substantially comply" with the
bill's requirements.
I TRAMn REG. REP. (CCH) 4231, at 6425-5 (Mar. 28, 1977). See Scher, Emerging Issues Under
tie Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 679, 695-97 (1977). See text accompa-
nying note 118 infra.
108. Senate Hearings Part 1223 (statement of Richard D. Godown). Out of more than 170
proposed transactions reported to the FTC and the Justice Department in the first six weeks after
the New Rules took effect, the enforcement agencies made 15 requests for additional information.
2 Merger Experts, supra note 98.
109. 43 Fed. Reg. 33,537, 33,550 (1978) (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. § 803.20(a)(1)).
110. Senate Hearings Part 1224 (statement of Richard D. Godown).
374 [Vol. 1979:355
V9 NTITR UST IMPR 0 VEMENTS A CT
cally prevent consummation of the transaction. In certain instances,
economic, commercial and financial conditions dictate prompt action,
and such delay could substantially interfere with the exercise of legiti-
mate business opportunities.""' The problem raised by governmental
interference is that "mergers are neither all good nor all bad,"'" 2 and
"good" mergers may be thwarted along with the "bad." The inhibition
or elimination of procompetitive mergers could have a detrimental ef-
fect on the important role of mergers and acquisitions of assets and
capital stock in the capital allocation process." 3
The possible harmful effect of premerger delay on the business
community must be balanced against several countervailing considera-
tions. First, the Act gives enforcement agencies the power, in individ-
ual cases, to waive the waiting period." 4 Insofar as any substantial
burden is imposed on business by the thirty-day mandatory delay, that
burden may be relieved-when the acquisition is lawful-by full and
open cooperation with the antitrust enforcement agencies, encouraging
111. House Hearings 193 (letter from the Association of the Bar of the City of New York). See
also House Hearings 7 (statement of Rep. Seiberling); House Hearings 192 (statement of Thad-
deus Holt) ("Undue prolongation of such a waiting period would kill an acquisition just as effec-
tively as an automatic stay order issued by a court"); Senate Hearings Part 1 223 (statement of
Richard D. Godown); Shenefield & Hartwell, AnnualSurvey ofAntitrust Developments 1975-76,34
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 7, 17 (1977) ("Negotiations are frequently so delicate that even the most
minute delays can result in all sorts of unexpected problems"); MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS, Fall
1976, at 41.
The Old Rules required notification 10 days after an agreement in principle was reached,
which usually created a de facto waiting period. See text accompanying notes 104-05 supra. How-
ever, the Old Rules did not automatically delay transactions that might be aborted if a waiting
period was required, as under the new program. See Senate Hearings Part 11173 (statement of
Eleanor M. Fox).
112. SENATE REPORT PART II 213 (quoting Milton Handler). See also Note, Preliminary Re-
lieffor the Government Under Section 7 /the Clayton Act, 79 HARV. L. REv. 391, 393 (1965).
113. "[Mergers] provide a mechanism whereby participants who choose to leave the market
can do so, while new competitors can enter. Business founders can reap the rewards of their
development efforts. Unsuccessful competitors can limit their losses. Diversified companies can
release inefficient or unsuitable segments of their enterprises." Senate Hearings Part II 1033 (let-
ter from Edward I. O'Brien). See SENATE REPORT PART I 212 (minority views of Senators East-
land, McClellan, Hruska, Thurmond, Scott); Senate Hearings Part 11I 209-10 (letter from Peter H.
Conze) ("An arbitrary waiting period will inhibit the free flow of capital in a somewhat depressed
economy by deterring lawful mergers").
Mergers may serve another necessary economic function by permitting companies to econo-
mize on taxes through the merger of a company with high tax liability with one which has accu-
mulated large amounts of tax credits, thereby benefitting both companies. Wall St. J., Jan. 30,
1976, at 10, col. 1, questioned in House Hearings 34 (statement of Paul Rand Dixon).
114. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(b)(2) (1976). At least one commentator, however, does not regard the
waiver provision as sufficient. Citing the "failing company doctrine" as an example of a situation
where mergers could not move quickly enough under the new program, she stated that "although,
of course, the antitrust authorities have discretion not to require the thirty-day waiting period-I
do not think that is enough in certain emergency situations." Senate Hearings Part 111 74-75
(statement of Eleanor M. Fox).
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them to exercise their waiver power. For a business with nothing to
hide, such a waiver could provide total protection from any harmful
delays.
Second, delays of forty to 120 days have been considered reason-
able and unlikely to cause serious business problems in practice. 1 5 In
light of this, a thirty-day waiting period should not be considered un-
reasonable.
Government requests for additional information will have adverse
effects on perishable financial transactions only if the parties to the
transaction have not anticipated such requests. The parties will pre-
sumably have engaged in extensive study of the proposed transaction
and will thus be in the best position to know what information will be
needed and the most efficient means of making that information avail-
able to the government. Therefore, the parties could file any additional
relevant material at the same time as the initial notification and seek
waiver of the waiting period, thereby avoiding any unnecessary de-
lays. 6
Lengthy delays resulting from government requests for additional
information could also be eliminated in two other ways. First, the gov-
ernment could be required to make any requests for additional infor-
mation or documents within a specified time after receiving the
notification (a ten-day period has been suggested), or to relinquish its
right to the discretionary time extension.1 7 However, no such require-
ment is found in the Act or the New Rules.
A second solution would require a liberal judicial interpretation of
the term "substantial compliance." The filing person must substan-
tially comply with the notification program. However, the parties to
the transaction should be able to ignore frivolous government requests
115. See House Hearings 106 (statement of Willard F. Mueller); id. 117 (statement of Kenneth
G. Elzinga); Senate Hearings Part 197 (statement of Thomas E. Kauper); id. 508 (statement ofJoseph F. Brodley); 2 Merger Experts, supra note 98; Fox, What's in that Antitrust Bill? Power to
Enforce Would Be Increased, N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 1976, § 3, at 12, col. 3.
116. House Hearings 187 (letter from Timothy J. Shearer).
Potentially, a waiting period could be long, but if you represent the offering com-
pany, you have the power to prevent long delay. On the day you file the notification, you
can call the government. If the acquisition is one that seems to present no antitrust
problems at all, you may be able to get a waiver of the waiting period from the govern-
ment. If there is to be no waiver, you can ask the govemment-the FTC or Justice
Department-what it will want in the way of additional documents and other informa-
tion and you can do this on day one.
Bicks, Antitrust Aspects of Takeovers and Mergers: The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement
[sic] Act of 1976-A Panel, 32 Bus. LAW. 1517, 1524 (1977). See Goolrick, supra note 2, at 71;
Shenefield & Hartwell, supra note 11, at 8.
117. Senate Hearings Part 11171 (statement of Eleanor M. Fox). See also SENATE REPORT
PART II 211; House Hearings 193 (letter from Association of the Bar of the City of New York).
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for information not reasonably related to the potential anticompetitive
effect of the transaction without risking failure to comply substantially
with the requirements of the notification program. This interpretation
would allow the transaction to be completed in such circumstances
without incurring penalties for violation of the Act." 8
While most transactions will be subject to the thirty-day waiting
period, the delay certainly should not be regarded as unreasonable. It
is the waiting period that promises to make the new program more ef-
fective for antitrust enforcement purposes. Without the delay, mergers
could be completed and the affairs of merged businesses become inter-
mingled before the enforcement agencies could institute actions seeking
preliminary injunctions. This would leave the government with resort
only to historically inadequate, post-acquisition relief. For the first
time, the mandatory waiting period gives the agencies an opportunity
to evaluate acquisitions prior to their consummation. The advantages
in terms of more effective antitrust enforcement do indeed appear real.
The foreseeable benefits of the new program must be weighed
against the potential adverse effects, in this case the risk of discouraging
procompetitive mergers along with the anticompetitive ones. However,
it is doubtful that the adverse effects on the business community caused
by the thirty-day delay in consummating merger transactions will out-
weigh the antitrust benefits of the waiting period. Thirty days is not an
unreasonable length of time, but in cases where the delay could present
a hardship, cooperation by the merging firms could result in waiver of
the waiting period. Furthermore, harmful delays associated with re-
quests for additional information could be mitigated by legislative ac-
tion limiting the time within which additional information could be
requested or by a liberal judicial interpretation of "substantial compli-
ance" that would permit the parties to ignore a government request for
additional information where the request would be difficult to comply
with or the information requested would be only marginally related to
valid antitrust considerations.
Some commentators have gone so far as to predict that the new
premerger notification program will ultimately prove beneficial to the
legitimate interests of the business community by enhancing planning
and predictability and by avoiding costly and time consuming litiga-
tion.119 Companies will be able more accurately to predict which trans-
actions will be subject to review and will be in a position to make post-
118. See note 107 supra.
119. See SENATE REPORT PART I 64-65 (quoting Thomas Kauper); Senate Hearings Part II
586 (letter from Rosemary M. Pooler). Shenefield & Hartwell, supra note 111, at 18.
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acquisition changes with greater confidence than is possible at the pres-
ent time.
C. Disclosure.
Unlike the Old Rules, which made the notification a part of the
public record, 2 ' the new premerger notification program specifies that
material submitted on or with the notification form shall be exempt
from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act.121 As with
most confidential business material, the possible disclosure of informa-
tion to potential competitors represents a major concern to the corpo-
rate world.
Those who support nondisclosure claim that the information
should be regarded as confidential and returned to the company sup-
plying it at the conclusion of the investigation to prevent the govern-
ment from maintaining dossiers on individual companies that would
allow future government monitoring. 22 This argument, however, ig-
nores the primary purpose of advance notification-providing govern-
ment enforcement agencies with sufficient information to enable them
to obtain a preliminary injunction against the consummation of an un-
lawful acquisition. The return of the information would impair the
ability of the enforcement agencies to evaluate future reported acquisi-
tions. By retaining the information, the agencies could compare pend-
ing mergers with those involving the same companies, products or
industry, and could make more accurate assessments of trends in merg-
ers and acquisitions, thereby accelerating a final decison regarding the
anticompetitive impact of a particular transaction. 23
A more persuasive argument emphasizes that a policy of nondis-
closure may tend to mitigate the potentially harmful effects of the wait-
ing period. Companies would not experience the same pressure to
consummate a merger in secrecy in order to avoid interference by com-
120. 39 Fed. Reg. 35,717, 35,717 (1974). See text accompanying note 69 supra.
121. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(h) (1976). As if to alleviate further corporate concern over possible leaks
of business information, the notification form itself states that "[all information and documentary
material filed in or with this form is confidential." 43 Fed. Reg. 33,552 (1978) (to be codified in 16
C.F.R. § 803).
122. House Hearings 113-14 (statement of Rep. Cohen).
123. The FTC has commented:
Nothing in the language or legislative history of the act appears to prohibit the use of
data submitted under the act for subsequent challenge to a reported acquisition or, in
fact, for any other law enforcement purpose. A challenge after the waiting period might
result from subsequent developments, such as additional acquisitions. Submitted mate-
rial can also be useful in investigations and challenges to other acquisitions. To return
the materials after the waiting period expires could seriously hinder later enforcement
efforts.
43 Fed. Reg. 33,450, 33,518 (1978).
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petitors or other interested parties. 24 The disclosure exemption does
insure that minimal guarantees of secrecy will be observed, thereby al-
leviating corporate concern to some extent.
At least one commentator has argued in favor of disclosure of the
notification information on the grounds that such disclosure is essential
to effective evaluation of the new premerger program by Congress and
the public.I25 However, the Act specifically provides that "[n]othing in
[the statute] is intended to prevent disclosure to either body of Congress
or to any duly authorized committee or subcommittee of the Con-
gress."' 26 Furthermore, virtually all acquisitions become public upon
completion. Legal actions instituted on the basis of information con-
tained in the notification forms will also become a matter of public
record. Therefore, it should not prove difficult to evaluate the new pro-
gram on the basis of public information.
The true impact of the nondisclosure provision of the new pre-
merger program is not yet settled. The new provision may prove less
significant than an initial reading might suggest. While the Old Rules
specifically provided that notification would be made a part of the pub-
lic record, no similar provision was included in the section dealing with
Special Reports. The omission was significant because the Special Re-
port, rather than the notification letter, contained the most confidential
information. 27 Thus, the amount of information that was subject to
disclosure under the Old Rules may not be significantly greater than
under the new program.'28 Furthermore, much of the information sub-
mitted may already be exempt'29 from disclosure under the Freedom of
Information Act, 3 at least during the waiting period, as commercial
business information falling within the investigatory exemption. 31
On the other hand, there is a legitimate basis for corporate concern
over the disclosure exemption. A question remains whether the exemp-
tion encompasses the fact of notification itself, or only the information
contained in the notification form. The Act speaks only of "any infor-
mation or documentary material filed." However, in many cases, dis-
closure of the mere fact of notification could trigger activity in the
business community that would make the contemplated transaction un-
124. See note 111 supra and accompanying text.
125. Senate Hearings Part 1 390 (statement of Mark Silbergeld).
126. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(h) (1976).
127. See text accompanying note 60 supra.
128. The notification letter would, however, alert competitors to the existence of a proposed
merger or acquisition and thus trigger the problems that may be avoided under the nondisclosure
provision.
129. Senate Hearings Part 198 (statement of Thomas Kauper).
130. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976).
131. Id. § 552(b)(7).
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profitable or even impossible. It will be the responsibility of the courts
properly to construe the disclosure exemption to require confidentiality
of the fact of notification itself. Such an interpretation would be bene-
ficial to business interests because greater protection would be afforded
to highly sensitive information. The FTC and the Antitrust Division
would benefit indirectly because the greater assurance of confidentiality
would encourage reporting firms to be more candid upon initial filing,
thereby diminishing the need to request additional information and
providing the agencies with a more complete record upon which to
evaluate the transaction.'
32
V. CONCLUSION
The premerger notification programs were designed to provide
antitrust enforcement agencies with more effective tools for halting un-
lawful transactions prior to their consummation. The effectiveness of
the programs can be measured by balancing the benefits in terms of
improved antitrust enforcement against the burdens imposed by the
notification processes. Unfortunately, the Old Rules proved inade-
quate in providing preliminary relief against unlawful acquisitions and
thus failed to achieve more effective enforcement of the antitrust laws.
The Act and the New Rules represent an attempt to remedy some of
the defects in the old program.
In general, the new premerger notification program seems likely to
provide enforcement agencies with a reasonable opportunity to seek
preliminary injunctions against the consummation of unlawful transac-
tions. The most important contribution in this regard is the thirty-day
waiting period, which will enable the FTC and the Antitrust Division
to evaluate proposed transactions and seek preliminary injunctions in
appropriate cases. More detailed reporting in the notification form it-
self and the agencies' option to request additional information should
lead to more accurate predictions of anticompetitive effects. Stiffer
penalties should provide a more effective deterrent to unlawful actions.
Finally, reliable guarantees of confidentiality should create a more co-
operative relationship between the enforcement agencies and the busi-
ness community.
The burdens imposed by the new program should also be consid-
132. The FTC's position on disclosure is as follows:
The Commission has taken the position not only that the contents of Notification and
Report Forms and responses to requests for additional information are confidential but
also that the fact of filing itself is a confidential matter. The statutory ban on disclosure
specifically relates to disclosure to thepublic. The Commission, however, has taken no
position on the issue whether the contents of a Hart-Scott-Rodino filing will be disclosed
to other agencies.
Letter from Malcolm R. Pfunder, Assistant Director for Evaluation, FTC, to John Titus (Febru-
ary 2, 1979) (on file at Duke Law Journal office) (emphasis in original).
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ered. These burdens take on added significance in view of the ex-
panded jurisdictional scope of the New Rules, which require more
firms to report a larger number of transactions. The antitrust benefits
to be realized as a result of more frequent reporting are questionable,
and the expanded coverage may even prove harmful because any bur-
dens created by the new program will be magnified. Retention of the
old $250 million criterion for reporting would probably have been
wiser.
The possibility of lengthy delays associated with the waiting pe-
riod provides the greatest cause for alarm. Such delays could diminish
the number of procompetitive mergers in the business community.
This possibility must be recognized and controlled. Waiver of the wait-
ing period as a result of cooperation between reporting firms and the
enforcement agencies and anticipation of government requests for ad-
ditional information could serve to minimize the length of delays. Leg-
islative or administrative limits on the time within which enforcement
agencies could request additional information would tend to prevent
abuse of the governmental privilege. Finally, a liberal judicial inter-
pretation of "substantial compliance" would allow companies to disre-
gard unreasonable government requests for additional information
without incurring penalties.
Because highly sensitive business information may be contained in
the notification form or submitted in response to requests for additional
information, it is vital to the business community that such information
remain confidential. The Act provides for this confidentiality, but stops
short of returning the submitted material to the reporting company.
The question of whether the fact of notification will remain confiden-
tial has not yet been answered. Resolution of this question may well
depend on the interpretation given to the Act's disclosure exemption by
the courts. Since notification alone may threaten the success of a pro-
posed transaction, the courts should keep the fact of notification confi-
dential.
Finally, post-acquisition relief has historically proven inadequate
to guarantee a competitive economy. Premerger notification coupled
with a mandatory waiting period appears to be a step in the right direc-
tion. The new premerger notification program promises greater success
in enforcement of the antitrust laws and, when tempered with proper
planning and judicial interpretation, it is a success not tainted by the
imposition of unreasonable burdens on government or the business
community.
John Warren Titus
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